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Law’s Religion: Religious Difference 
and the Claims of Constitutionalism, by 
Benjamin L. Berger1
HOWARD KISLOWICZ2
BENJAMIN BERGER’S LAW’S RELIGION: Religious Difference and the Claims of 
Constitutionalism is a remarkable work of sharp analysis and deft prose. For 
readers within legal academia and practice, the book sets a challenging task: 
to examine from the outside a structure in which they are sitting. The central 
insight of Berger’s book is that Canadian constitutional law is a culture, a system 
of symbols that structure and generate meaning, deeply influenced by a liberal 
tradition and a particular history. Berger reminds us that even those who agree 
with this basic proposition often find themselves speaking of law as if it were 
above or without culture. Through examples drawn principally from Canadian 
court decisions, Berger shows persuasively that when law encounters religion, 
we witness a meeting of cultures, each with its own symbolic, aesthetic, and 
normative commitments. The participants in this cross-cultural encounter, 
however, are not equal in power. The law has a coercive capacity unavailable to 
most religions, which sometimes makes the encounter colonial or conversionary 
in character. Berger argues that this is not a problem that can be cured; law 
cannot help but be a culture, and its impulse to rule is deeply ingrained. Instead, 
Berger provocatively suggests that judges should cultivate their indifference to 
1. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015) [Berger].
2. Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of New Brunswick. Thanks go to Tom 
Champion for his research assistance and to Kathryn Chan for helpful comments on a 
previous draft. Special thanks, as always, to Dr. Naomi Lear and Gabriel Kislowicz.
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difference, widening the spaces for minority religious practices by reading them, 
where possible, as inoffensive to the state’s basic commitments. For those familiar 
with Berger’s previously published work,3 some of these themes will be familiar. 
Put together in this monograph, the larger arcs of Berger’s arguments come into 
sharper focus as he draws out the connections between those earlier pieces. Law’s 
Religion also represents a significant development of Berger’s thought on possible 
responses to the more problematic aspects of law’s meeting with religion.
In what follows, I delve more deeply into three distinguishing features of 
Berger’s argument. First, I discuss Berger’s methodological approach, which begins 
from the lived experience of legal subjects instead of focusing on abstract ideas 
of law or theory. Second, I address Berger’s exposition of the culture of Canadian 
constitutional law, along with the limits and conversionary tendencies of this 
culture. Third, I consider Berger’s suggested adjudicative virtues—fidelity and 
humility—as a response to the difficulties encountered when law casts religion 
in its own image. I conclude by suggesting that future scholarship, nurtured by 
Berger’s approach, could enrich understandings by incorporating the voices and 
perspectives of religious individuals and communities subject to the law’s rule.
I. METHODOLOGICAL SHIFT: FOCUS ON LIVED 
EXPERIENCE, NOT LAW OR THEORY
Constitutional analysis tends to start from first principles. The terms of 
constitutional rights are usually broad, and the lawyer’s instinct is to define the 
terms before putting them into action in a given case.4 So it is when we turn 
our imaginations to the relations between state and religion and to principles 
of secularism. Berger claims that “such analysis, whose point of departure is an 
ideal of ‘the secular,’ ultimately hides more than it illuminates.”5 In part, this is 
because there are many varieties of secularism, each an idiosyncratic product of its 
geographical, historical, and political context. More crucially for Berger, setting 
up a grand theory of secularism as a point of departure tends to “strip away 
3. See generally Benjamin L Berger, “Law’s Religion: Rendering Culture” (2007) 45:2 Osgoode 
Hall LJ 277; Benjamin L Berger, “The Cultural Limits of Legal Tolerance” (2008) 21:2 
Can JL & Jur 245; Benjamin L Berger, “The Aesthetics of Religious Freedom” in Winnifred 
Fallers Sullivan & Lori G Beaman, eds, Varieties of Religious Establishment (Burlington, 
Vermont: Ashgate, 2013) 33.
4. See e.g. Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, 2004 SCC 47, [2004] 2 SCR 551 at para 39 (Justice 
Iacobucci adopts a provisional definition of religion before analyzing how the right of 
religious freedom applies in a particular context).
5. Berger, supra note 1 at 33.
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lived experience”; the “prescriptive and explanatory breadth” of such accounts 
is achieved “at the expense of regard for the messy details of wrestling with the 
relationship between religion, law, and politics.”6
Instead, Berger advocates a “phenomenological turn in the study of law 
and religion, one that seeks to privilege experience of the law as the analytic 
starting point, rather than legal concepts or ideal forms of theory.”7 He does this 
by understanding the meeting of law and religion as a cross-cultural encounter. 
Such an approach does not start by defining terms or relying on metaphors 
such as a wall of separation between law and religion. Instead, it investigates 
the competing cultural commitments of both law and religion that are exposed 
when the two meet.8
II. CULTURAL COMMITMENTS OF CANADIAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In Berger’s view, law’s cultural understanding of religion has three overlapping and 
mutually reinforcing elements: “(1) religion as essentially individual, (2) religion 
as centrally addressed through autonomy and choice, and (3) religion as private.”9 
When Canadian constitutional law explains the purpose of religious freedom, 
says Berger, it focuses on the “individual’s sense of his or her own relationship 
to the divine or to the object of faith,”10 and Berger finds ample support in the 
case law for this claim. This individualistic orientation is consistent with the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s (SCC) general approach to the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms,11 “a product of the structure and the informing [liberal] 
ideology” of that document.12 This orientation can mean that some claims of 
religious communities are not cognizable by courts. Berger points to the case of 
Adler v Ontario as an example, in which several minority religious communities 
sought provincial funding for their schools equal to that provided to Catholic 
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid at 36.
8. In taking this approach, Berger acknowledges the influence of Paul Kahn. See Paul W 
Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law: Reconstructing Legal Scholarship (Chicago: University Of 
Chicago Press, 2000).
9. Berger, supra note 1 at 66.
10. Berger, supra note 1 at 66.
11. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 
(UK), 1982, c 11.
12. Berger, supra note 1 at 72.
(2016) 54 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL294
schools in Ontario.13 Berger says the claim failed not only because it impugned 
another constitutional provision that guaranteed Catholic school funding, but 
also because the claim to community-based education does not fit within the 
individualist mould.14
While Law’s Religion offers a compelling reading of Adler, that case also reveals 
at least one way in which Canadian constitutional culture sometimes understands 
religion in terms of communities rather than just individuals. The constitutional 
protection of Catholic denominational schooling rights in Ontario is given life 
through institutions. While the educational rights vest in individuals, the schools 
are sites of community autonomy in a way that cannot be completely reduced 
to individual rights. Indeed, in a recent case, though the majority of the SCC 
declined to answer the question whether corporate bodies can claim religious 
freedom rights, a Catholic school (rather than any individual) was granted a 
remedy in the name of religious freedom, and a concurring minority held that 
religious schools and other organizations could bear rights of religious freedom.15
This said, Berger’s claim about the strong pull of individualism is well 
demonstrated through other examples. According to Berger, law’s concern 
with autonomy predisposes courts to understand religion as something made 
meaningful in a person’s life principally because it is chosen. Though some say that 
contemporary religious freedom jurisprudence has shifted from a concern with 
freedom toward a preoccupation with identity16 or equality,17 Berger argues that 
law ultimately justifies its concern with identity-related harms by focusing on the 
autonomy of the identity-bearer.18 So, when Jehovah’s Witness parents made a 
religious freedom claim against a state decision to require a blood transfusion for 
their baby, the SCC was unanimous that the decision did not violate the Charter, 
13. Adler v Ontario, [1996] 3 SCR 609, 140 DLR (4th) 385.
14. Berger, supra note 1 at 74.
15. See Loyola High School v Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 12 at paras 33-34, 89-102, 
[2015] 1 SCR 613. To be clear, Berger is careful to recognize that Canadian constitutional 
law has some regard for collective dimensions of religious practice. His claim, more finely 
put, is that “wherever else its eyes might wander, in the contemporary treatment of religious 
liberties, Canadian constitutional law invariably returns to a sharp focus on the individual” 
(Berger, supra note 1 at 68-69).
16. Richard Moon, “Religious Commitment and Identity: Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem” 
(2005) 29 SCLR (2d) 201.
17. Mary Anne Waldron, Free to Believe: Rethinking Freedom of Conscience and Religion in Canada 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013).
18. Berger, supra note 1 at 87-88.
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and one of the concurring judgments justified this result through its preservation 
of the child’s autonomy in choosing her faith until she developed that capacity.19
Finally, Berger claims that law relegates religious commitment to the private 
sphere, a domain “in which we are governed in our actions and dispositions 
not by the universalism of reason but by the particularities of love, preference, 
and belief.”20 This orientation helps make sense of the distinction the court 
has drawn between religious belief and practice.21 “As belief only, religion is a 
preference that remains solidly and unproblematically within the realm of the 
personal. As conduct, it might seep into the realm of the public where interest 
and preference have a troublesome status.”22
The Court drew the belief/conduct distinction in a case addressing Trinity 
Western University’s (TWU) Community Covenant, which prohibited students 
from engaging in same-sex or unmarried sexual intimacy (among other things). 
In the absence of evidence supporting the British Columbia College of Teachers’ 
claim that graduates of TWU’s education program would likely discriminate 
against LGBTQI students once in the classroom, the Court held that the College 
of Teachers penalized TWU on the basis of (private) belief rather than (public) 
conduct. But the Community Covenant can equally be understood as a religious 
practice that crosses into the public realm when TWU seeks accreditation by a 
public regulator. In fact, now that TWU has proposed establishing a law school 
while still retaining a similar Community Covenant, this has been an argument 
pursued with mixed success by the law societies of British Columbia, Ontario, 
and Nova Scotia, in denying accreditation.23 The differing results of these cases 
support Berger’s argument that law is hospitable to religious difference only 
when the religion can be understood as private. In one of the cases where TWU 
was successful, the court held that “[p]ermitting TWU graduates to article in 
19. RB v Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 SCR 315, 122 DLR (4th) at 
para 230 [Children’s Aid Society]; Berger, supra note 1 at 90.
20. Ibid at 91.
21. Trinity Western University v College of Teachers (British Columbia), 2001 SCC 31 at para 36, 
[2001] 1 SCR 772.
22. Berger, supra note 1 at 94.
23. Trinity Western University v The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONSC 4250 (Div Ct), 
aff’d 2016 ONCA 518, 398 DLR (4th) 489 [TWU v LSUC]; Trinity Western University v The 
Law Society of British Columbia, 2015 BCSC 2326, 392 DLR (4th) 722, aff’d 2016 BCCA 
423; Trinity Western University v Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, 2015 NSSC 25, aff’d 2016 
NSCA 59, 401 DLR (4th) 56 [TWU v Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society].
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Nova Scotia will not open the door to discrimination in Nova Scotia.”24 In other 
words, there will not be public consequences, at least in the province of the 
regulator’s jurisdiction. In contrast, in the case where TWU was unsuccessful, 
the court reasoned that the law society, as a gatekeeper of the legal profession and 
an entity subject to Ontario’s human rights legislation, could take into account 
the discriminatory nature of TWU’s Community Covenant. In this view, the 
Community Covenant’s impact reverberates into the public sphere, and can thus 
not be tolerated when it conflicts with one of law’s values (non-discrimination).25
Indeed, Berger says that “the extent and character of legal tolerance 
for religion may turn on a religion’s conformity with the law’s conceptual 
commitments about religion.”26 When courts ask “if a limit on religious freedom 
is justified, the question is assessed within the values, assumptions, and symbolic 
commitments of the culture of Canadian constitutionalism itself.”27 Courts wind 
up assessing the tolerability of a religious practice based on their culturally infused 
understanding of how religion works and why it is valuable, focusing on how the 
practice relates to individual autonomy and whether its implications were private 
or public.28 So, when a religious practice can be digested as consistent with 
law’s cultural commitments, such as a Sikh high school student choosing to wear 
his kirpan, the cultural difference is more likely to be tolerated.29 In contrast, 
the Jehovah’s Witness parents discussed above, who sought to prevent a blood 
transfusion for their infant child, “found the limit of legal tolerance at the border 
of individual autonomy and choice.”30 While religious views may be permitted 
in public discussions of school board policies, they are intolerable when they 
fail to comply with the cultural values of inclusion and equality.31 The message 
of the cases, says Berger, is that law behaves as if it meets an equal partner in 
cross-cultural exchange only when law’s fundamental values are respected. When 
they are not, law will impose its will in a more conversionary kind of encounter.32
24. TWU v Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, ibid at para 253. The Court of Appeal upheld the 
decision on administrative law grounds, holding that the Barristers’ Society had overstepped 
its jurisdiction by arrogating to itself the power to determine whether a university had 
engaged in unlawful discrimination.
25. See TWU v LSUC, supra note 23 at paras 130–35 (Divisional Court reasons), 118-19, 138 
(Court of Appeal reasons).
26. Berger, supra note 1 at 101.
27. Ibid at 117.
28. Ibid at 118.
29. Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 2006 SCC 6, [2006] 1 SCR 256.
30. Berger, supra note 1 at 123; Children’s Aid Society, supra note 19.
31. Chamberlain v Surrey School District No 36, 2002 SCC 86, [2002] 4 SCR 710.
32. Berger, supra note 1 at 126.
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For Berger, law’s conversionary impulse is not something that actors in 
Canada’s legal system can change. While some might hope that law and religion 
could meet as mutually respecting partners in dialogue, each learning and growing 
from its engagement with the other, Berger concludes that “[t]he distinctive 
character of the culture of contemporary constitutionalism… precludes [this] 
kind of dialogical engagement.”33 For those committed to building a pluralistic 
society where minority groups are respected precisely for their cultural difference 
this sounds like depressing news. But in his final argumentative manoeuvre, Berger 
provides an intriguing response: those who care deeply about the merits of cultural 
diversity should work on getting courts to care less about cultural difference.
III. HUMILITY, FIDELITY, AND EXPANDING INDIFFERENCE
Taking seriously the idea that law and religion meet as two distinct cultures means, 
for Berger, that judges should be at once more faithful to the culture of Canadian 
constitutional law and humbler about law’s assumed exclusivity in generating 
norms and meaning in the lives of individuals and communities. Berger argues 
that, though in tension, the virtues of fidelity and humility will allow judges to 
leave more space for alternate cultural forms that can be interpreted as not in 
conflict with state values.
Judges can accomplish this, says Berger, by being more transparent about the 
cultural commitments of law. If judges imagine law as a culture rather than as 
above culture, they can lay down the impossible burden of “juridically solving the 
cultural tensions between law and religion.”34 Instead, judges can react to cultural 
difference by “[staying] the violent hand of the law,” expanding the array of 
religious practices to which law is indifferent, marking them as “not intolerable.”35 
And even when law determines that a practice is beyond the boundaries of its 
toleration, a judge who understands such determinations as stemming from 
cultural differences will explain a litigant’s loss by “gesturing to a reason other 
than the inability of the individual to participate in a rational community.”36
One example Berger uses to show this ethic in action is Justice Abella’s 
dissenting judgment in Hutterian Brethren.37 In assessing the litigants’ objection 
33. Ibid at 139.
34. Ibid at 177.
35. Ibid at 177-78.
36. Ibid at 187. For an example of this form of reasoning, see Berger’s discussion of Justice 
Binnie’s dissenting view in Children’s Aid Society, supra note 19 at 174-75.
37. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony v Alberta, 2009 SCC 37 at paras 110-77, 
[2009] 2 SCR 567.
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to being photographed, Justice Abella is faithful to the culture of constitutional 
law by understanding the claim in terms of autonomy, focusing on whether the 
legislation left the colony with a meaningful choice between religious observance 
and civil obedience. Having done so, she “provides a sterling example of the 
cultivation of indifference” by emphasizing the minimal impact that would have 
been occasioned by the colony’s desired accommodation, concluding that the law 
should not be bothered by it.38
IV. WHERE TO FROM HERE?
Berger’s resolve to find a new entry point to analyzing the relations between 
law and religion yields a subtle and well-supported account of why the tensions 
between them seem intractable. Berger exemplifies the virtue of humility by not 
claiming to have found a new way to end these conflicts. Instead, he encourages 
his readers to inhabit them faithfully, humbly, and honestly. While law’s colonial 
impulse may never be completely stayed, Berger offers hope that it can at least be 
tamed. For those who find Berger’s account convincing, there is much work to 
be done. As discussed above, Berger insists on an approach focused on the lived 
experience of legal subjects rather than grand questions of theory or overarching 
legal doctrine. Though Berger’s accounts of the religious practices at the centre 
of some disputes are moving,39 we cannot know how deeply they resonate with 
the lived experience of religious practitioners until we hear their stories in their 
own voices. One way of doing this is to ask them, in interviews, to give their 
own accounts;40 a less direct way is to examine the written and oral arguments 
advanced on their behalf.41 Berger’s account is rich, and worth reading carefully. 
Future studies could build on its foundations by drawing on the practical 
methodologies of cultural anthropology that inspired some of Berger’s thinking.
38. Berger, supra note 1 at 184.
39. See the discussion of the eruv and the succah (ibid at 43-45).
40. See e.g. Angela Campbell, “Bountiful Voices” (2009) 47:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 183; Anne Saris 
& Jean-Mathieu Potvin, “Canadian Muslim Women and Resolution of Family Conflicts: 
An Empirical Qualitative Study (2005-2007)” in Silvio Ferrari & Rinaldo Cristofori, eds, 
Law and Religion in the 21st Century (Surrey, BC: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2010) 339; 
Howard Kislowicz, “Sacred Laws in Earthly Courts: Legal Pluralism in Canadian Religious 
Freedom Litigation” (2013) 39:1 Queen’s LJ 175.
41. For one example, see the discussion of Amish litigation in Robert Cover, “Nomos and 
Narrative” in Martha Minow, Michael Ryan & Austin Sarat, eds, Narrative, Violence, and the 
Law: The Essays of Robert Cover (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992) at 95.
